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Almost a year after former President Evo 
Morales was ousted in a coup d’état, his politi-
cal party, Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), 
reassumed power under the leadership of Luis 
Arce Catacora in November 2020. Videos of 
MAS supporters celebrating outside the party 
headquarters on election night warmed the 
hearts of the party’s support base and sympa-
thetic foreign observers alike.1 Bolivian democ-
racy, it appeared, had prevailed.
Former coca grower Evo Morales had man-
aged to maintain stability and popularity for the 
first decade of his fourteen-year tenure, with 
many Bolivians thinking of him as hermano 
Evo, brother Evo. After coming to power in 
2006, his regime formed a central part of the 
group of progressive governments in Latin 
America known collectively as the pink tide, 
and oversaw massive reductions in poverty and 
inequality, largely owing to the global com-
modity boom (2002-2011). However, his presi-
dency ended at the behest of the military in the 
face of widespread violence across the country. 
What caused this fall from power? And now 
that his party is back in power, what are the 
prospects for the future?
While it is tempting to compare President 
Arce’s election with that of Morales some 
fifteen years earlier, the context today is quite 
different. Although the MAS has a social move-
ment base, it is not broadly representative, and 
a political economy centered around extractiv-
ism, coupled with the limitations of a postcolo-
nial state, has eroded the cross-class support 
that it formerly enjoyed. The return of the left to 
power in the form of Arce is not a panacea, and 
the country remains in the grips of an economic 
and health crisis with roots in broader dynamics 
in the global economy and the Covid-19 
pandemic.
Situating Bolivia
Bolivia is often overlooked when envisioning 
Latin America. Some think of this landlocked 
country that spans from the high peaks of the 
Andes to the sprawling expanse of the Amazon 
rainforest as a small country, despite the fact 
that it has a geographical area comparable to 
that of France and Germany combined. This is 
partly because Bolivia was once much bigger 
and has lost approximately half of its landmass 
since its independence from the Spanish Empire 
in 1825, with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Paraguay all claiming chunks of its territory as 
spoils of a series of regional conflicts. It is also 
partly because Bolivia has a relatively small 
population of just over 11 million people, a 
large proportion of whom are Indigenous. In 
the 2012 census, over 41 percent of Bolivians 
self-identified as Indigenous, down from 62 
percent in the 2001 census due to a change in 
methodology.2 The largest Indigenous group is 
the Aymara followed by the Quechua, who have 
historically lived on the Andean highland pla-
teau and in the tropical valleys of Cochabamba 
at the center of the country. For centuries, the 
Indigenous population was excluded from 
national politics. In the post-colonial period, 
political rights were tied to land titles and liter-
acy, denying political rights to Indigenous com-
munities and reproducing the apartheid system 
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formed under Spanish colonial rule. Evo 
Morales was welcomed by many as the coun-
try’s first Indigenous president and marked a 
watershed moment in the erosion of these old 
colonial structures of domination.
. . . the Bolivian Workers Central 
(COB) became, along with the 
central government, one of the 
two central pillars of the National 
Revolutionary State, demonstrating 
the strength of the Bolivian labor 
movement. 
Since the discovery of silver in the city of 
Potosí in 1545, Bolivia’s political economy has 
been shaped by extractivism. During the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, the Spanish 
crown took silver from Cerro Rico (Rich Hill) in 
Potosí to pay off its debts to the British and 
Dutch. Later, the second silver boom in the 
1850s brought British commercial interests to 
the country, and with them, the first railways. 
The twentieth century was the century of tin, 
which formed the material basis of the powerful 
tin barons and, after the 1952 revolution, the 
National Revolutionary State. Although the 1952 
revolution displaced the power of the tin barons, 
the nationalized tin mines remained the basis of 
the country’s political economy. As such, it 
helped to forge a labor movement in the mining 
centers, which, influenced by different strands of 
Marxism, became one of the most radical work-
ing-class movements in the world.3 During this 
period, the Bolivian Workers’ Center (COB) 
became, along with the central government, one 
of the two central pillars of the National 
Revolutionary State, demonstrating the strength 
of the Bolivian labor movement. Hydrocarbons 
also shaped the historical trajectory of Bolivia 
during the twentieth century, with oil playing a 
part in the Chaco War between Bolivia and 
Paraguay in the 1930s and natural gas becoming 
increasingly important during the 1990s follow-
ing the construction of two pipelines to the large 
markets of neighboring Argentina and Brazil. 
Struggles over how to exploit natural gas 
resources and distribute the revenues, coupled 
with a contentious plan to export Bolivian gas 
through Chilean seaports, were central to the 
emergence of social movements that carried 
Morales to power in 2005. Morales announced 
the nationalization of gas on May Day in 2006 
through a spectacular occupation of the Margarita 
gas field, although in reality nationalization 
entailed only a renegotiation of gas contracts 
with multinational oil firms.4 Natural resources, 
then, are central both to Bolivia’s political econ-
omy and to its politics.
The Social Base of the MAS
When Morales was in power, the MAS famously 
declared itself “the government of social move-
ments.”5 At its heart are the coca growers of 
the Chapare region in the department of 
Cochabamba. When neoliberal reforms forced 
the tin miners from their encampments in the 
late 1980s, many found their way to the tropical 
valleys of the Chapare in search of new liveli-
hoods. They brought with them their radicalism 
and strong organizations, leading the coca grow-
ers to become the vanguard of the resistance to 
neoliberalism by the early 1990s. The coca 
growers pushed the Trade Union Confederation 
of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CSUTCB) to cre-
ate a political instrument, which eventually 
became the MAS. Evo Morales rose through the 
ranks of the coca growers’ movement and main-
tained his position as the leader of the Six 
Federations of the Tropics of Cochabamba dur-
ing his time in office. The genesis of the MAS as 
the political instrument of the CSUTCB and the 
coca growers’ role in its formation mean that 
these both have an “organic” relationship with 
the party. In other words, they will support the 
party no matter what because it is their political 
instrument.6
[The displaced tin miners] brought 
with them their radicalism and 
strong organizations, leading 
the coca growers to become the 
vanguard of the resistance to 
neoliberalism by the early 1990s. 
While the MAS has a solid foundation in 
peasant organizations, its relationship with 
other movements is more complicated. Away 
from the CSUTCB, there are a number of social 
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movements, including the COB, which are 
merely contingent supporters. Unlike the 
organic relationship between the MAS and the 
CSUTCB, the relationship between the MAS 
and these groups is constantly being renegoti-
ated and is mediated in several ways.7 One is 
through the incorporation of social movement 
leaders into government, creating a symbiotic 
relationship between the two and recasting 
social organizations as routes into formal poli-
tics. Another is the creation of formal channels 
linking social movements and the state, such 
as the National Coordinator pro Change 
(CONALCAM) and the Vice-Ministry for the 
Coordination with Social Movements and Civil 
Society. This amounts to what political econo-
mists Federico Rossi and Eduardo Silva label 
“state managerialism,” whereby social move-
ment demands are technically fulfilled, giving 
the MAS legitimacy in the eyes of some and 
stripping the more radical factions of move-
ments of their mobilizing demands.8 This was 
central to Morales’ first term and although it 
has since declined in importance, it has not 
entirely disappeared as the presence of social 
movement leaders in the administration sug-
gests. At the same time, the MAS also used 
another form of incorporation, informal contes-
tation, whereby social movements can only 
react to government policy after its implemen-
tation, rather than playing a role in shaping the 
policy process itself. This came to be the pre-
dominate form of relationship between the 
MAS and social movements from 2010 onward.
The economic development 
strategy of the MAS was to foster 
capital accumulation in mining 
and hydrocarbon extraction and 
then use increased revenues to 
redistribute natural resource wealth 
through social programs . . . 
Together, these modalities of incorporation 
built the coalition of social movements that was 
so important in ensuring the return to democ-
racy with the elections in October 2020. 
However, the coalition of social movements 
behind the MAS had changed significantly over 
the past decade, in part because of the 
contradictions contained in its development 
model, in part due to the dynamics of incorpo-
ration outlined above. The economic develop-
ment strategy of the MAS was to foster capital 
accumulation in mining and hydrocarbon 
extraction and then use increased revenues to 
redistribute natural resource wealth through 
social programs such as conditional cash trans-
fers, higher minimum wages, and an expanded 
state bureaucracy.9 While this met one of the 
major social movement demands of the years 
2000-2005, these demands largely emanated 
from Indigenous movements in the highlands 
and discounted (or ignored) the experiences of 
lowland movements based in territories directly 
affected by extractivism. In 2011, Morales’ 
government violently repressed an Indigenous 
march protesting the construction of a highway 
through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and 
Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS).10 This marked the 
beginning of divisions between the MAS and, 
in particular, the lowland Indigenous move-
ment CIDOB leading the march. The TIPNIS 
conflict shattered the image of the MAS as the 
representative of Indigenous people, undermin-
ing its support in lowland regions and among 
groups that do not share its growth-oriented 
development view.
The decision to incorporate social move-
ments into the state has also fragmented the sup-
port base of the MAS, limiting the capacity for 
renewal within certain movements and tying 
organizations to the MAS. In some cases—such 
as CIDOB, the highland Indigenous movement 
CONAMAQ, and the Yungas-based coca grow-
ers ADEPCOCA—organizations have fractured 
into pro- and anti-MAS factions, dividing their 
bases into two and leading to confrontations 
within movements. In the labor movement, the 
COB has been aligned with CONALCAM and 
the MAS since 2018, when Juan Carlos Huarachi 
became executive secretary following an inter-
nal purge of union leaders not aligned with the 
MAS, breaking the ties between individual 
unions and the national COB in the process. The 
COB has long held dear its principle of political 
independence, and Huarachi’s opponents con-
tend the COB’s alliance with the MAS is under-
mining its independence, hampering its role as 
“defender of the rights of all the workers of the 
country.”11
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The ways in which social organizations, 
including the COB, have been incorporated into 
the MAS create a tendency for them to become 
empty shells unable to mobilize their bases, 
which is in effect why the COB could not defend 
Morales in October-November 2019. But why 
did Morales need defending in the first place?
Changing Political Winds
Despite growing divisions between the MAS 
and some Indigenous movements following the 
2011 TIPNIS march, the MAS won the 2014 
national elections comfortably. Although the 
relationship between the movements and the MAS 
changed after 2011, this did not translate into a 
political challenge to the MAS until February 
21, 2016, when Morales made a political miscal-
culation and organized a referendum to change 
the constitutional limits on presidential terms to 
allow him to stand for re-election. The referen-
dum represented a serious political defeat for 
Morales, with the “no” vote narrowly winning.
. . . [T]he fall in commodity prices, 
and resulting fall in revenues, 
from 2013 onward pitted the MAS 
government against agribusiness 
and transnational companies 
working in mining and gas 
extraction . . . 
The vote happened in the context of the end 
of the pink tide and the growing political attacks 
on progressive governments in the region, 
including most notably Brazil, through the polit-
icization of corruption charges.12 In Bolivia, the 
fall in commodity prices, and resulting fall in 
revenues, from 2013 onward pitted the MAS 
government against agribusiness and transna-
tional companies working in mining and gas 
extraction, leading to growing political tensions 
before the referendum and worsening the fiscal 
position of the Bolivian state.
The seeds of what was to come were planted 
in the campaigns around the referendum, with 
opposition groups inventing a love child from 
one of Morales’ past relationships, decrying 
fraud in the vote before the count was complete, 
and politicizing the use of state funds through 
discourses around corruption. A new constitu-
tion, adopted in 2009, had replaced the National 
Electoral Court (CNE) with a new Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal (TSE), enabling opposition 
forces to erode public trust in electoral institu-
tions in the period preceding the vote. Although 
the opposition “no” campaign won and so the 
issue of electoral fraud was quietly dropped, the 
precedent had been set. By September 2019, 
such was the ferocity of the attacks on the elec-
toral organs of the state that 68 percent of 
Bolivians believed that there would be electoral 
fraud in October’s elections.13
The opposition to Morales, broadly speak-
ing, comprised three currents: urban middle 
classes and aspirational working classes; envi-
ronmental and lowland Indigenous communi-
ties; and lowland elites linked with agribusiness. 
The first was articulated through discourses 
around “democracy” and comprising the urban 
middle classes and university students, most of 
whom were under the age of twenty-five and 
concerned with limited formal employment 
opportunities. They are either children of the 
upper middle classes who view formal posi-
tions (particularly within the state apparatus) as 
a birthright or the first in their family to go to 
university, frustrated that this has not led to 
promised social mobility. The second opposi-
tional current were environmentalist and 
Indigenous groups, mainly from the eastern 
lowland regions, who found themselves at odds 
with the development project of the MAS. 
Members of the final oppositional group are the 
lowland elite, which mounted opposition to the 
MAS political project on a regional scale, par-
ticularly during Morales’ first term. The low-
land departments of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, 
and Tarija—home to most natural gas reserves 
and the majority of the country’s agribusi-
ness—threatened to split the country into two 
when faced with nationalization and the new 
constitution. While they ultimately overplayed 
their hand in 2008 when the governors of the 
lowland departments headed a failed coup 
d’état against Morales, concerns about the 
internal distribution of resources and, ulti-
mately, political power did not disappear 
entirely. After a period of alliance between the 
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MAS and the lowland elite, following the 2016 
referendum this group saw an opportunity to 
recapture state power. These three oppositional 
currents were at the heart of the protests that led 
to Morales’ downfall in 2019.
The Interim Government of 
Jeanine Áñez
The 2019 elections were a tumultuous affair, 
marred by largely unfounded accusations of elec-
toral fraud and widespread violence. Morales 
was forced by the military to leave the country on 
November 10, allowing a politician from a minor 
political party, Jeanine Áñez, to assume power 
three days later. Áñez’s conservative political 
party, Social Democratic Movement (MDS), 
won only just over 4 percent of the national vote 
in the parliamentary elections, which translated 
into four seats in the lower chamber. However, 
pressure on the MAS forced several prominent 
MAS-affiliated politicians to step aside, leaving 
her route to power open. More important than her 
party in Áñez’s rise to power was her support 
from lowland oppositional groups, including the 
right-wing Pro-Santa Cruz Committee, led by 
Luis Fernando Camacho. Although Catholic 
himself, Camacho has become a magnet to which 
Bolivia’s quietly growing evangelical movement 
is aligning, marking the early signs of its influ-
ence in politics.
The interim government of Áñez oversaw a 
year marked by violence, corruption, and 
administrative missteps. In the days that fol-
lowed the coup, her regime directed state vio-
lence at the main MAS support groups, killing 
scores of coca growers in Sacaba and working-
class people at Senkata in the city of El Alto.14 
The 2020 elections were repeatedly delayed—
first from January to May, then from May to 
September, finally from September to October, 
during which time her government tilted toward 
the United States by joining the Lima Group 
(a right-wing coalition against Venezuelan 
President Nicolas Maduro) and breaking diplo-
matic ties with, among others, Cuba and Iran.15 
Áñez also attempted to lock in a neoliberal eco-
nomic program, liberalizing agricultural pro-
duction, privatizing state-owned enterprises, 
and revising hydrocarbon contracts.16
During this time, the naked self-interest of 
Áñez’s ministers and supporters became 
increasingly evident.17 Consecutive health min-
isters were ensnared in corruption scandals 
after overpaying for ventilators to tackle the 
Covid-19 pandemic.18 During her final days in 
office, Áñez awarded over 3400 hectares of 
land titles to her economic minister, Branko 
Marinković, one of the perpetrators of the coup 
against Morales in 2008. Returning from exile 
in Brazil, he had joined Áñez’s cabinet in 
August 2020, apparently the only man willing 
to step into her cabinet as her regime became 
more and more beleaguered.19
Actions by MAS senators were a 
major reason why elections finally 
went ahead last October, the 
other being the push from social 
movements—including the labor 
movement.
Áñez did not have total free rein, however. 
The MAS still controlled the legislature and, led 
by Senate President Mónica Eva Copa, it did its 
best to hold her government to account. Actions 
by MAS senators were a major reason why elec-
tions finally went ahead last October, the other 
being the push from social movements—including 
the labor movement. After the government 
announced further delays to elections set for 
September 6, MAS-aligned social movements 
headed by the Unity Pact (a coalition of country-
wide rural Indigenous and urban movements) 
and the COB sprang into action.20 The COB 
recovered some of its strength following its 
impotence during the coup against Morales and 
led marches against the Áñez government in six 
departments on July 15, and again on July 28, 
when it spearheaded a march from Senkata, the 
site of the massacre of November 2019 in El 
Alto, to the city’s central zone, La Ceja.21 Faced 
with the prospect of further election delays, the 
Unity Pact and the COB organized a national 
blockade that was sustained for twelve days 
between August 2 and August 14.22
While not all groups responded to the COB’s 
call to action—citing concerns over the continu-
ing pandemic and economic situation23 and the 
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criminalization of movement leaders24—social 
movements mounted enough political pressure 
that further election delays proved politically 
unviable. The conflicts were ostensibly about 
the date of the elections, but they revealed the 
widespread discontent with Áñez and helped 
solidify a coalition of social forces capable of 
pushing for the return to democracy.25 In the 
words of Juan Carlos Huarachi, executive secre-
tary of the COB, “the people are asking [the 
Áñez government to] respect democracy, respect 
healthcare, respect education and respect our 
dignity.”26 After almost a year, it was this push-
back that enabled Arce to assume office.
The Road Ahead
Now that Arce is in office, his government 
faces a number of interconnected challenges. 
First, Bolivia remains dependent on primary 
commodity exports for state revenues. Even 
before the pandemic arrived, falling commod-
ity prices had hit the economy and state coffers 
hard. The value of hydrocarbon exports fell by 
half in the past five years, from over US$2.2 
billion in 2015 to a projected US$1.1 billion in 
2020.27 This has been accompanied by a rever-
sal of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows as 
capital flees the country in search of greener 
pastures. Net FDI flows have fallen from over 
US$700 million in 2014 to a projected US$190 
million in 2020.28 Foreign reserves fell from a 
high of over U.S.$15 billion in 2014 to a little 
over US$6 billion five years later, even before 
Arce’s proposed devaluation wiped a further 
US$1.2 billion from the national accounts.29 If 
Morales inherited the country during a time of 
plenty, the opposite is true of Arce, who faces 
the challenge of managing an economy exposed 
to the volatile global commodity market during 
an international health crisis.
The Covid-19 pandemic hit Bolivia hard, 
with the country recording one of the highest 
excess death rates per capita of anywhere in the 
world during its first wave.30 There are a num-
ber of reasons for this. First, the health care sys-
tem is chronically underfunded, and the country 
lacks a public health system, leaving many 
without health care coverage and hospitals at 
risk of being overrun from the slightest increase 
in demand. Most of the economically active 
population (EAP)—by some estimates over 80 
percent31—works in the informal economy with 
no social security. The national lockdown mea-
sures presented many with a Hobson’s choice: 
death by the virus or death by hunger. This has 
limited the impact of social distancing measures 
while also weakening the immune systems of 
the poorest through an increase in malnutrition.
The Covid-19 pandemic hit Bolivia 
hard, with the country recording 
one of the highest excess death 
rates per capita of anywhere in the 
world during its first wave. 
Arce has worked hard to procure the Russian 
Sputnik and the British AstraZeneca vaccines 
for the Bolivian population during his first 
months in office—an astute move given 
Bolivia’s previous position at the back of the 
vaccination queue. However, the country’s 
health care system remains weak and it lacks 
the infrastructure to distribute the vaccines to 
all parts of its vast territories. A shipment of 
vaccines arriving in one major city in the back 
of a food truck demonstrates the logistical dif-
ficulties. Although the director of the depart-
mental health care system insists the truck 
complies with the vaccine requirements, not all 
makeshift solutions will, and coordinating the 
program, especially in sparsely populated 
regions with poor roads and no hospitals, will 
present multiple challenges. This is especially 
true given the fact that much of Arce’s support 
is conditional on his government being able to 
honor its promises to different sectors and to 
keep the majority of the population protected 
from the sharp end of the crisis. When the econ-
omy is doing well, it is easy to keep everyone 
happy, but in contexts of crisis, building and 
maintaining political alliances is much harder. 
Increased hardship will quickly burn through 
any political capital Arce has banked with those 
groups not organically tied to the MAS.
Another salient question concerns Evo 
Morales. Now that he is back in the country, 
how will the internal dynamics of the party play 
out? Morales continues to be the head of the 
McNelly 7
MAS and has always ruled the party with an 
iron fist, repeatedly curtailing the prospects of 
potential leadership contenders. In a disturbing 
example, in late 2020 Morales ran a vicious 
campaign against Senator Mónica Eva Copa, 
one of the most popular of the new generation 
of MAS leaders, during the selection of the 
party’s mayoral candidate in the city of El Alto. 
The result was that Copa left the party and ran 
on the ticket of the Indigenous party Jallalla, 
winning 67 percent of the vote in El Alto.32 This 
dynamic—between the party led by Morales 
and the government under Arce—could be a 
challenging one for the current president, espe-
cially given the vigorous opposition to Morales 
among his political opponents. Morales may be 
back in the country, but it remains to be seen 
whether this is a blessing or a curse for Arce’s 
government.
Morales continues to be the 
head of the MAS and has always 
ruled the party with an iron fist, 
repeatedly curtailing the prospects 
of potential leadership contenders. 
A third critical question is whether the Arce 
government can keep the opposition in check. The 
lowland elite in particular will seek to maximize 
their share of shrinking agribusiness and hydro-
carbon revenues and the urban middle classes will 
not continue to support (or at least tolerate) him if 
jobs are lost and their social standing is threat-
ened. The government recently detained former 
president Jeanine Áñez for her role during the 
2019 putsch, along with the former justice minis-
ter,33 leading to accusations, including by new 
U.S. President Biden’s administration, that it is 
interfering with the justice system.34 
There are still unanswered questions about 
the reach of imperial power into Bolivian poli-
tics.35 Groups within all three oppositional cur-
rents have links to external forces, with the U.S. 
government funding parts of the opposition to 
the MAS in the name of democracy promotion 
and environmental sustainability.36 One of the 
conspirators behind the 2019 coup has publicly 
said that the transition to power from Morales 
to Áñez was planned by oppositional groups 
coalesced around democracy, the lowland 
elites, and sections of the military in coordina-
tion with representatives from Brazil and the 
European Union.37 Whether or not this is true, it 
demonstrates what Arce is up against, and while 
he does have some allies in the region, he does 
not enjoy the geopolitical alliances forged by 
former pink tide governments.
 . . . [A]ll . . . oppositional currents 
have links to external forces, with 
the U.S. government funding parts 
of the opposition to the MAS in the 
name of democracy promotion and 
environmental sustainability . . . 
In sum, although the MAS has returned to 
power, whether it has fully weathered the storm 
remains to be seen. Arce’s government faces a 
dire economic situation and, despite the prom-
ise of a future vaccine, a rampant pandemic. 
The political landscape, although not as explo-
sive as it was a year ago, remains divided. 
Opposition groups lie in the wings, biding their 
time, while many of the 55 percent who gave 
Arce their vote did not do so unconditionally. A 
worsening of the current crisis could place Arce 
under enormous strain. The MAS is not out of 
the woods just yet.
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